Cases, Regulations, and Statutes by Achenbach, Robert P, Jr
Volume 12 | Number 20 Article 2
10-12-2001
Cases, Regulations, and Statutes
Robert P. Achenbach Jr
Iowa State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized editor of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Achenbach, Robert P. Jr (2001) "Cases, Regulations, and Statutes," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 12 : No. 20 , Article 2.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol12/iss20/2
Agricultural Law Digest 155
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE . The U.S. Supreme Court has granted
certiorari in the following case. The debtors filed their 1992
tax return on October 15, 1993 without paying the taxes. The
debtors made a few small payments on the taxes but then
filed for Chapter 13 in May 1996. The 1992 taxes were
included in the case and the case was voluntarily dismissed
in March 1997 on the same day that the debtors filed for a
new Chapter 7 case. The debtors argued that the 1992 taxes
were dischargeable because they were filed more than three
years before the Chapter 7 bankruptcy case. The court held
that the three year period in Section 523(a)(1) was tolled
during the Chapter 13 case; therefore, the taxes were
nondischargeable. In re Young, 233 F.3d 56 (1st Cir.
2000).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CLEAN WATER ACT.  The plaintiffs claimed that the
defendant’s hog feeding operation violated the Clean Water
Act (CWA) by applying liquid animal waste on nearby fields
without obtaining a National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The plaintiffs alleged
that the sprayed animal waste ran off the fields and into
waters protected by the CWA. The defendant moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the spraying of the animal
wastes on the fields was separate from the hog feeding
operation. The court denied summary judgment and held that
the field spraying activity was an integral part of the hog
feeding operation, which was a concentrated animal feeding
operation subject to NPDES permit requirements. Wat r
Keeper Alliance v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 4:01-CV-
27-H(3) (E.D. N.C. Sept. 20, 2001).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
TUBERCULOSIS . The APHIS has adopted as final a
regulation which splits Texas into two zones with different
tuberculosis risk classifications. 65 Fed. Reg. 49271 (Sept.
27, 2001).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The taxpayer established
a ten-year charitable lead annuity trust. The taxpayer served
on the board of directors of the charitable beneficiary of the
trust. The charitable organization bylaws placed the annuity
income from the taxpayer’s trust in a separate account and
prohibit  the taxpayer from voting on any aspect of the use
of those funds by the charity.  The IRS ruled that the transfer
of stock to the trust was a completed gift and that the
axpayer had not retained any power over the annuity
income. The IRS also ruled that the trust corpus would not
be inclu ed in the taxpayer’s estate. Ltr. Rul. 200138018,
June 25, 2001.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS .  The
decedent transferred a residence to a trust for the benefit of
the decedent’s grandchildren. The taxpayer’s daughter was
named as trustee and had the power to distribute income to
the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries also had the power to
withdraw a maximum of any amounts contributed to the
rust in a year or $10,000. The trust also provided that, at the
death of the decedent, the residence was to be provided rent
free to the decedent’s spouse. The decedent continued to live
in the residence without paying rent to the trust and paid all
expenses associated with the residence. Three of the
beneficiaries were minors.  The court held that there was an
implied agreement between the parties to the trust to allow
the decedent to continue to use the residence until death;
ther fore, the decedent retained an interest in the residence
and the fair market value of the residence was included in
the decedent’s estate. Estate of Trotter v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2001-250.
VALUATION . The taxpayer contributed property to a
family limited partnership in exchange for a 5 percent
preferred general partnership interest and 93 percent limited
partnership interest. The preferred general interest was
entitled to a minimum guaranteed distribution plus 5 percent
of partnership net income. The taxpayer also had the right to
withdraw from the partnership with 90 days’ notice and the
right to terminate the partnership. The taxpayer’s children
owned the remaining 2 percent general partnership interests.
The IRS ruled that the taxpayer’s preferred general interest
was an applicable retained interest and the withdrawal and
termination rights were extraordinary payment rights. The
IRS also ruled that the value of the applicable retained
interest, the preferred general interest, had to be determined
under I.R.C. § 2701 and the value was the lowest value of
the guaranteed payment right, the withdrawal right or the
termination right. The value of the gift to the children was to
be determined using the subtraction method, subtracting the
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value of the preferred general partnership interest from the
value of the property contributed to the partnership. Ltr.
Rul. 200138028, June 21, 2001.
The decedent’s estate include an interest in a family trust
which owned timberland. The decedent’s predeceased
spouse had also owned an interest in the trust. The
predeceased spouse’s estate applied a 25 percent discount for
a fractional interest and the decedent’s estate discounted the
decedent’s interest by a 60 percent fractional interest. The
estate and IRS agreed as to the fair market value of the
timberland held by the  trust but disagreed as to the amount
of discount to be applied to the decedent’s interest in the
trust. The court noted that the trust management was under
the control of one family member who had not managed the
investment well and that the trust was formed in order to
keep the land in the family. The court also noted that the
decedent’s and predeceased spouse’s estate increased their
claimed discount to 90 percent at trial. The court held that a
60 percent discount would be applied for the fractional
interest, based on the opinions of the estate’s experts and the
history of discounts used in the area. Estate of Baird v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-258.
The decedent formed a family limited partnership and
contributed stock in exchange for a 98 percent limited
partnership interest and a 1 percent general partnership
interest. The other 1 percent was received by the decedent
child. The decedent then transferred a 45 percent limited
partnership interest to the child, a 15 percent interest to the
child’s spouse and a 38 percent interest to a trust. The main
issue was the discount which would be applied to the value
of the interests transferred. The court held that an aggregate
40 percent discount for lack of marketability and minority
interest would be applied to each of the transferred interests.
Estate of Dailey v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-263.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was an attorney
who claimed business deductions for travel, meals and
entertainment, and interest. The deductions were
substantiated by a business calendar which identified the
names of the clients or employees, detailed memoranda
about the purpose of the meeting, and receipts and credit
card statements. The court held that the taxpayer had
adequately substantiated the travel and meals and
entertainment expenses. The taxpayer claimed the deduction
in 1995 even though the expense was incurred and paid for
with the credit card in 1994. The taxpayer argued that the
expense could be claimed in the tax year in which the credit
card bill was paid, 1995, instead of the year in which the
credit card debt was incurred, 1994, for the expense. The
court held that the expense was deductible in the tax year the
credit card debt for the business expense was incurred. The
interest expense was paid on the credit card accounts which
the taxpayer used to pay business expenses. The taxpayer
argued that the interest was incurred as part of the business
operation. The court held that the interest expense was an
allowable business deduction to the extent the taxpayer
demonstrated that the interest was actually paid. Burton v.
Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-155.
The d cedent’s estate included stock in a personal holding
company. The court held that the value of the stock was to
be d termined based on the fair market value of its assets,
which consisted mainly of timberland, after taking into
acc unt the present-value, corporate-level capital gains tax
consequences, but without regard to other discounts or a
beneficiary settlement agreement. A discount was allowed
for potential, corporate-level capital gains because the
company had a valid I.R.C. § 631 election that treated the
cutting f timber each year as though it were a sale or
exchang  of the timber. Moreover, the court found that the
most likely buyer of the stock would be a timber company or
pension fund that would take into account the present-value
t x consequences of built-in capital gains when arriving at
the mount to pay for the company's stock. The court held
that the estate was entitled to a 3 percent lack-of-
marketability discount because 3 percent of the assets of the
company lacked marketability. However, a nuisance
discount due to the existence of a minority shareholder was
not allowed in light of the desirable assets of the corporation.
The appellate court reversed on the issue of the proper
discount for the capital gains liability. The appellate court
held that the Tax Court had followed inconsistent
assumptions that, on the one hand, a buyer would continue
the long-term logging of the land and that, on the other hand,
the low rate of return from logging would be too low for
most investors. Est. of Jameson v. Comm’r, 2001-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,420 (5th Cir. 2001), rev’g and
rem’g, T.C. Memo. 1999-43.
C CORPORATIONS-ALM  § 7.02[3].*
COMPENSATION. The taxpayers, husband and wife,
were the sole shareholders and officers of a corporation
which operated a concrete foundation business. The court
held that the compensation paid to the taxpayers was
unreasonable based on (1) compensation paid by similar
businesses in the area and (2) the amount an independent
investor in the corporation would consider reasonable in
comparison to the return on the investment. B & D
Foundations, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-262.
DISTRIBUTIONS. The IRS has adopted as final
regulations which apply the rules of I.R.C. § 357(d),
involvi g the treatment of liabilities assumed by a
shareholder, to distributions under I.R.C. § 301. The
proposed regulations provide that the amount of a
istribution under Section 301 will be reduced by the
amount of any liability that is treated as assumed by the
distributee within the  meaning of Section 357(d)(1) and (2).
66 Fed. Reg. 49279 (Sept. 27, 2001).
MERGER. The IRS had assessed taxes against a
corporation and the assessment was upheld upon appeal to
the Tax Court. The taxpayer corporation merged with that
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corporation and under the merger agreement, the taxpayer
agreed to assume all liabilities of the corporation. The IRS
then assessed the taxpayer for the taxes owed by the prior
corporation. The taxpayer argued that its liability for the
taxes was limited to the value of the assets acquired from the
former corporation and that it was the responsibility of the
IRS to prove the value of the assets. The court held that the
taxpayer had agreed to assume all of the former
corporation’s liabilities but did not rule on the issue of
whether the liability was limited to the value of the former
corporation’s assets because the taxpayer presented no
evidence as to the value of the former corporation’s assets.
Eddie Cordes, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-265.
SALE OF ASSETS. The taxpayer was the sole owner of a
corporation which operated a beer distributorship. The
taxpayer sold the company to unrelated parties and the sales
agreement contained a covenant not to compete and a
consulting agreement under which the taxpayer was hired as
a consultant for five years. No allocation of the sales
proceeds was made for intangible assets such as good will
and going concern value. The IRS argued that a portion of
the amounts allocated to the covenant not to compete and the
consulting agreement was actually properly allocated to the
intangible assets. The court noted that much of the
taxpayer’s business was dependent upon the taxpayer’s
personal relationship with retailers and the taxpayer’s
personal knowledge of the area. The court also noted that the
company buyers were unfamiliar with the beer distribution
business in general and in the specific region supplied by the
company in particular. The court assigned a portion of the
sales proceeds to the covenant not to compete and the
consulting agreement based on the importance of the
agreements to the success of the buyers’ continuation of the
company’s business. The court held that the remainder of the
amount allocated under the sale contract to the covenant not
to compete and the consulting agreement had to be allocated
to the intangible assets. Bemidji Distributing Co., Inc. v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-260.
COOPERATIVES . The taxpayer was a cooperative
formed under a state cooperative limited liability statute
which did not classify cooperative LLCs as corporations.
The IRS ruled that the taxpayer was an eligible entity under
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-3 and not a per se corporation under
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b)(1). Ltr. Rul. 200139020, June
29, 2001.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS-ALM §
4.02[14].* The taxpayer’s employment as a regional manager
of retail stores was terminated and the taxpayer brought suit
against the employer for breach of contract, breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, age discrimination
under state law, fraud and deceit, and specific performance.
The trial jury awarded damages to the taxpayer under the
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. The taxpayer argued that the award was excluded
from gross income because one of the claims involved a tort
or tort like issue. The court held that the judgment was
included in the taxpayer’s gross income because the award
was based entirely on the contract cause of action and was
not based on any tort or tortlike claim involving personal
injury. The taxpayer had hired attorneys for the lawsuit
under a contingency fee arrangement and the judgment
award c ck was made out jointly to the taxpayer and the
attorneys. The court held that the attorney’s fees were not
excluded from the taxpayer’s income but could only be
claimed as a miscellaneous deduction. The court followed
Benci-Woodward v. Comm’r, 219 F.3d 941 (9th Cir. 2000),
affg, T.C. Memo. 1998-395 decided in the circuit to which
this case is appealable. Freeman v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2001-254.
The taxpayer was forced to resign employment by the
taxpayer’s employer. The taxpayer joined a class action suit
against the employer which alleged age discrimination and
other torts. The taxpayer signed an agreement to pay the
class attorneys one-third of any recovery. A settlement was
reached and the plaintiffs in the action allocated the proceeds
first to litigation and administration costs. One-third of the
remainder was allocated to the attorneys’ fees, one-third to
compensation for lost wages, and one-third for the tort
injuries. The employer paid one-third of the settlement
directly to the attorneys and the remainder to the class and
agreed to withhold income taxes from the amount allocated
to compensation for lost wages. The court held that the
amount paid as attorneys’ fees by the employer was included
in t e taxpayer’s income because the liability for the fees
was the responsibility of the taxpayer and not the employer.
Sinyard v. Comm’r, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶.
50,645 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1998-364.
The taxpayer joined a class action suit against the
taxpayer’s former employer under the FSLA for unpaid
ov rtime compensation. A settlement was reached and was
based o  the number of hours worked by each participant in
the suit. The taxpayer excluded from income the taxpayer’s
share of the settlement, arguing that the settlement was
actually based upon a claim for infliction of emotional stress.
The court noted that no claim was included in the lawsuit or
the settlement allocation among the plaintiffs. The court held
that the proceeds of a suit under the FSLA were included in
income because the FSLA action was not a tort or tort-like
action for personal injuries. In addition, the court held that
no portion of the settlement could be allocated to a claim for
infliction of emotional distress because that claim was not
included in the lawsuit, the settlement or the calculation of
the taxpayer’s share of the settlement. Ra y v. Comm’r,
T.C. Summary Op. 2001-156.
The taxpayer had purchased an automobile dealership and
eventually filed suit against the manufacturer’s distributor
for breach of contract, violation of state and federal anti-
racketeering laws, fraud, and injunctive relief. The parties
reached a settlement which did not allocate any of the
proceeds to any personal injury claim. The court held that
the settlement proceeds were included in the taxpayer’s
income because the law suit  did not allege any personal
injuries and the settlement did not allocate any of the
proceeds to compensation for personal injuries. In re Jones,
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2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,638 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2001).
DEPRECIATION. The taxpayers were partnerships
which claimed depreciation for natural gas pipelines owned
and operated by the partnerships. The partnerships’
operations did not involve any production of the natural gas.
The court held that under Rev. Proc. 87-56, 1987-2 C.B. 674,
pipeline transportation was a separate business and the assets
were properly classified under Class 46.0 as 15-year
property for depreciation purposes. Saginaw Bay Pipeline
Co. v. United States, 2001-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,642 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
DISASTER LOSSES. The IRS is reminding taxpayers
who have suffered property losses due to the September 11,
2001 terrorist attacks that they may get a quick tax refund by
claiming such losses on amended returns for tax year 2000.
Affected taxpayers include individuals and businesses in
presidentially-declared disaster areas. By amending tax year
2000 returns, taxpayers may receive refunds in a few weeks
rather than after the filing of a 2001 return. Taxpayers that
were granted extensions to file tax year 2000 returns may
include disaster losses on such returns. IR-2001-87. In
addition, the IRS reminded corporate taxpayers that they
may claim a quick refund of estimated tax overpayments
before they even file their tax return. This could help fiscal
year filers whose expected profits were reduced or
eliminated by the September 11 terrorist attacks or by other
conditions. The proper form is Form 4466, “Corporation
Application for Quick Refund of Overpayment of Estimated
Tax.” IR-2001-90.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer was
employed as a real estate agent in an agency company. The
taxpayer had financial difficulties and the employer agreed
to purchase the taxpayer’s house and rent it back to the
taxpayer. The taxpayer failed to make all rent payments. The
taxpayer made a sale of real estate and the employer
withheld a portion of the commission due to the taxpayer
equal to the amount owed for the rent. The taxpayer argued
that the amount withheld by the employer was not income
because the taxpayer disputed the amount owed. The court
found that the amount was not in dispute because the
taxpayer did not pursue the matter. The court held that the
entire commission was income to the taxpayer. Velasco v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-252.
EMPLOYEE EXPENSES . The IRS has issued revenue
procedures updating Rev. Proc. 2000-39, I.R.B. 2000-41,
340, which provide rules under which the amount of
ordinary and necessary business expenses of an employee
for lodging, meals, and incidental expenses or for meals and
incidental expenses incurred while traveling away from
home will be deemed substantiated under Temp. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.274-5T when a payor (the employer, its agent, or a third
party) provides a per diem allowance under a reimbursement
or other expense allowance arrangement to pay for such
expenses. This revenue procedure also provides an optional
method for employees and self-employed individuals to use
in computing the deductible costs of business meal and
incidental expenses paid or incurred while traveling away
from home. Use of a method described in this revenue
procedure is not mandatory and a taxpayer may use actual
allowable expenses if the taxpayer maintains adequate
records or other sufficient evidence for proper substantiation.
This revenue procedure does not provide rules under which
the amount of an employee's lodging expenses will be
deemed substantiated when a payor provides an allowance to
pay for those expenses but not meals and incidental
expenses. Rev. Proc. 2001-47, I.R.B. 2001-__.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayer was an attorney who
owned an apple and timber farm. The taxpayer planted oak
and walnut trees on the timber land and expected the trees to
be suitable for sale in 40 years. The court held that the farm
was not operated with an intent to make a profit because (1)
the taxpayer did not have a business plan for making a profit
and did not keep complete records of the farm activities, (2)
the taxpayer did not have any previous farming experience
and did not consult experts on how to make the activity
profitable, (3) the taxpayer spent a minimal amount of time
on the activity, (4) the activity never produced a profit, (5)
the taxpayer offset the losses against substantial income
from other activities, and (6) the taxpayer used the activity
primarily for recreational purposes. The court acknowledged
that the oak and walnut trees would eventually have much
value and potential for profit, but the court held that the mere
waiting for trees to grow was not enough to make the
activity a business.  Burton v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary
Op. 2001-155.
The taxpayer was an attorney and accountant and owned a
100 acre farm which the taxpayer inherited from parents.
The taxpayer allowed a brother-in-law to use a portion of the
land for growing hay and pasture rent free but the brother-in-
law provided some maintenance of the farm. The taxpayer
used the farm timberland for growing oak and walnut trees
which would produce marketable wood in 30-50 years and
marketable nuts in five years. The court held that the farm
was not operated with the intent to make a profit because (1)
the taxpayer did not have a business plan to make the farm
profitable and did not keep full and accurate records, (2) the
taxpayer did not have the expertise to make the farm
profitable and did not seek the advice of experts, (3) the
taxpayer expended significant amounts of time on the farm
but did not provide evidence that this time was spent making
the farm profitable, (4) although the farm appreciated in
value over the period it was held by the taxpayer, the
average appreciation each year did not exceed the annual
losses, (5) there was no evidence that the taxpayer had
contributed to the success of the farm when it was held by
the parents, and (6) the farm had only losses and no source
of income for three years. The other factors of Treas. Reg. §
1.183-2(b) were found to be neutral on this issue. Mitchell
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-269.
Th  taxpayer was a medical doctor and the taxpayer and
spouse started an activity which purchased, trained, showed
and s ld jumper horses. The activity was started primarily
because the taxpayer’s children were interested in riding
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jumper horses. The horses were maintained at third party
farms and operated by employees. The activity was
terminated when the child no longer participated in riding
the horses. The court held that the activity was not engaged
in with the intent to make a profit because (1) the taxpayers
did not have a business plan for making the activity
profitable; (2) the taxpayers did not have any expertise in
running a profitable horse business and did not obtain the
advice of experts on making the activity profitable; (3) the
taxpayer failed to provide evidence of a significant amount
of time spent at the activity; (4) the activity only produced
losses; (5) the taxpayers had significant income from their
medical practice which was partially offset by the losses; (6)
the taxpayers and their children received significant amounts
of person pleasure from the activity; and (7) the taxpayers
carried on the activity primarily to provide riding horses for
their children. The taxpayers were not assessed an accuracy-
related penalty because the taxpayers reasonably relied on
the advice of professionals in filing their tax returns. Pri to
v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-266.
IRA. The taxpayer was employed during 1997 for a month
and a half with an employer who provided an employee
pension plan. The taxpayer contributed $131 to the pension
plan before terminating employment and accepting
employment at two other companies which did not offer
pension plans. The taxpayer opened an IRA during 1997,
contributed $2000 to the account and claimed a $2000 IRA
deduction on the 1997 return. The taxpayer argued that the
IRA deduction was allowed because the taxpayer’s interest
in the pension plan never vested under the rules of the plan.
The court held that, under Treas. Reg. §1.219-2(b), the
taxpayer was an active participant in a defined benefit plan
sometime in 1997; therefore, under I.R.C. § 219(g)(1), the
taxpayer was not eligible for an IRA deduction in 1997.
Held v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-149.
The taxpayer was employed during 1997 for two weeks
with an employer who provided an employee pension plan.
The taxpayer contributed to the pension plan before
terminating employment. The taxpayer opened an IRA
during 1997, contributed $2000 to the account and claimed a
$2000 IRA deduction on the 1997 return. The taxpayer
argued that the IRA deduction was allowed because the
taxpayer’s interest in the pension plan never vested under the
rules of the plan. The court held that, under Treas. Reg.
§1.219-2(b), the taxpayer was an active participant in a
defined benefit plan sometime in 1997; therefore, under
I.R.C. § 219(g)(1), the taxpayer was not eligible for an IRA
deduction in 1997. Naemi v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op.
2001-158.
MEDICAL SAVINGS ACCOUNT . The IRS has
announced that the Archer Medical Savings Account (MSA)
pilot project will not be cut off in 2001 because the number
of individuals who have established Archer MSAs on or
before April 15, 2001, has not exceeded 750,000. The
applicable number of MSA returns projected to be filed for
2001 is 76,035. Ann. 2001-99, I.R.B. 2001-42.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM §  7.03.*
PARTNER”S DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE. In 1993, the
taxpayer owned a 5 percent interest in a partnership. In 1993,
the partnership exchanged some real estate for other real
estate and recognized gain on the transaction. The
partnership return for 1993 reported that the taxpayer’s share
of the gain was $61,983. The taxpayer failed to report the
share of partnership gain on the taxpayer’s income tax return
because no actual distribution of the gain was made to the
partners. The court held that the taxpayer had to report the
taxpayer’s share of the gain as income, whether distributed
or not. Chama v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2001-253.
PENSON PLANS. For plans beginning in September
2001, the weighted average is 5.77 percent with the
permissible range of 5.20 to 6.06 percent (90 to 106 percent
permissible range) and 5.20 to 6.35 percent (90 to 110
percent permissible range) for purposes of determining the
full funding limitation under I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice
2001-58, I.R.B. 2001-39, 299.
SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS. The taxpayer lived in
Washington D.C. during 1997 while receiving medical
treatment while the taxpayer’s spouse lived in California, the
ou les’ primary residence.  The couple did not file a joint
re urn for 1997. The court held that the taxpayer lived apart
for the spouse for 1997 for purposes of I.R.C. § 86(c). The
taxpayer incurred legal expenses in obtaining the social
securi y medical benefits and some of the benefits were paid
directly to the lawyers. The court held that the amounts paid
to the l wyers was considered part of the benefits received
by the taxpayer. Reese v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op.
2001-153.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, received social security
benefits in a tax year in which they had adjusted gross
income sufficiently high to include 85 percent of the social
security benefits in gross income under I.R.C. § 86. The
taxpayer had excluded the social security benefits from
income on the basis of statements made to them by an IRS
employee. The court held that the IRS was not bound by the
statements of the employee as to interpretations of law;
therefore, the social security benefits were included in gross
income. Clayborn v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-
152.
The taxpayer received a lump sum payment of social
security disability payments in 1997 for benefits which
accrued in 1995 and 1996. The taxpayer excluded the
payment from income, arguing that the payment was a
disability payment. The court held that social security
disability payments are included in income under I.R.C. §
86(d)(1). A portion of the payment was paid directly to the
taxpayer’s lawyer. The court held that the payment to the
lawyer was included in the taxpayer’s income and was
eligible for the miscellaneous deduction as an expense
incurred for the production or collection of income. Dela
Cruz v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-154.
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TAX SHELTERS . The IRS has announced that I has
revoked Rev. Proc. 83-78, 1983-2 C.B. 595 and Rev. Proc. 84-
84, 1984-2 C.B. 782 which describe  procedures  which had
been used by the IRS to identify and investigate abusive tax
shelter   promotions.   The   procedures   will    now   be
published in the IRS Manual or other guidance. Rev. Proc.
2001-49, I.R.B. 2001-39, 300.
The taxpayers had invested in a jojoba partnership which was
audited and denied research and development expense
deductions. The taxpayers were then denied a passthrough
deduction for their share of those expenses. This case involved
assessment of the I.R.C. § 6653(a)(1) 5 percent addition to tax
for underpayment of tax for negligence. The court held that the
taxpayers had unreasonably relied on the partnership promoter
for information about the tax benefits of the partnership. The
court noted that the taxpayers were not inexperienced investors
and should have seen the need to seek expert advice about the
investment. Davis v. Comm’r, T.C. Summary Op. 2001-151.
TRUSTS. The taxpayers, husband and wife, transferred their
business assets and residence to two trusts. The trusts were held
to be shams because the taxpayers carried on the businesses and
used the residence as before the trusts were formed and
exercised control over the trusts. Snyder v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2001-255.
The taxpayers, husband and wife, transferred their business
assets to seven trusts. Payments for services rendered by the
taxpayers in these businesses, rental income, and other funds
ere deposited in the trusts' bank accounts which the taxpayers
retained control over for personal use. The income was reported
on the trusts’ tax returns but were not included in the taxpayers’
income tax returns. The court held that the trusts were shams
and ineffective assignments of income earned personally by the
taxpayers. The court also held that the case was brought by the
taxpayers primarily for delay and was based on frivolous
arguments; therefore, the taxpayers were assessed $25,000 in
I.R.C. § 6673(a)(1) penalties. Combs v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2001-264.
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS PUBLICATIONS ON CD-ROM
FAST AND COMPREHENSIVE . These CDs give you the speed and efficiency of computers in access to agricultural law. The combination
Agricultural Law Digest and Agricultural Law Manual CD contains 12 years of developments in agricultural law and the complete text of the
most comprehensive single book on agricultural law. Agricultural law becomes as accessible as a mouse click. You can search the files, print any
page or download selected text to your computer.    There is no time or other limit to your use of these disks  .
FULL WORD AND PHRASE SEARCH: A simple and effective search program included on the CDs allows searching of all documents for
words and phrases. The facsimile format allows you to browse through the book page by page as if viewing the paper version of the materials.
CROSS-PLATFORM ACCESSIBLE .  These CDs make use of Adobe Acrobat Reader + Search.© The CDs and software are fully compatible
with Windows, Macintosh, UNIX and most major operating systems. Adobe Acrobat uses PDF files similar to those used by the IRS to
electronically download forms and publications on the internet. The pages can be searched, copied to your word processor, and printed.
UPDATES AVAILABLE . The CDs will be fully updated three times a year with new CDs provided with each update. You can subscribe to
all updates or an annual update. Supplement the CD with an e-mail subscription to the Digest and you will have a comprehensive and timely
computer research resource for your agricultural client’s needs.
OFFERED IN THREE VERSIONS : (1) The archive of all 12 years of the Digest (includes all Digests published as of the date of your
order); (2) the entire Manual; and (3) both the Digest archive and the Manual.
                 Disk                                                                                                                      Price                                    Annual update                        Triannual update
Agricultural Law Digest (12 year archive) and
       Agricultural Law Manual..................................................$200...........................$90......................$100
Agricultural Law Digest (12 year archive)....................................$150...........................$75.......................$90
Agricultural Law Manual........................................................$100...........................$75.......................$90
Agric. Law Manual (for current Manual subscribers).........................$50...........................$75.......................$90
To order your disk, send a check to: Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 50703, Eugene, OR 97405  Please indicate whether you want an annual
update or tri-annual update subscription. For more information, see http://www.agrilawpress.com
